Article abstract
In the early twentieth century numerous primary extractive industries constructed company towns on the resource frontiers of North America. Company directors hoped that massive capital infusion in remote areas in the form of planned towns would secure a much-needed skilled workforce and generally increase returns. The pulp and paper town of Corner Brook in western Newfoundland is a significant, but largely neglected case in point. This paper details the paternalist and utilitarian motivations of companies for single-industry community construction at this time. More importantly, however, it offers a new and critical approach to the issue of single-industry community development. Early multinational companies sought to secure a place "on the ground" through comprehensive planning and community administration. At the same time, residents of Corner Brook, though constrained by dependence on the sole industry, negotiated their own physically and socially distinct community in a variety of ways. The global-local nexus of company planning, resident response, and change introduces a complexity into the study of company towns that are generally portrayed in terms of rigid top-down company exploitation of a "captive" workforce.
Introduction
The single-industry community looms large in the history of late19th and 20th-century Canada. 1 In 1971, sociologist Rex Lucas noted the existence of 636 such towns, with a combined population of just over 900,000, and in 1986 historian Oiva Saarinen showed that 25 per cent of Canadians living outside metropolitan areas were residents of single-sector communities.
2 During the latter half of the 1800s various industrialists began to exploit Canada's untapped timber and mineral resources. The settlement of a workforce had to accompany these developments. Settlements most often took the form of "company towns": communities constructed, owned, administered by, and dependent upon a sole industrial enterprise. They were characterized by a marked degree of industrial paternalism grounded in a utilitarian business ethic. Employers sought to "control" or administer the lives of their workers, the majority of residents, in order to ensure a stable, efficient workforce and secure a profit. At the same time, residents created community by engaging in various forms of negotiation with the companies. 3 This paper explains how patemalistically minded companies influenced by ideas of model town planning established "instant" single-industry resource communities on the margins of North American settlement in the early 20th century. In Corner Brook, residents modified these top-down and foreign planning practices over time, creating a community that was markedly physically different from original company plans. It was also selfconsciously localist, despite residents' continued dependence on global capital. The early history of Corner Brook shows that resource communities were not simply creations of global capital but were shaped to a significant extent by the local dynamics of formal and informal resident negotiation with the industrial hegemon. The planning and negotiation nexus between the polarities of global capital and local community creation at Corner Brook also provides tantalizing glimpses of direct antecedents to the "distant proximities" evident in contemporary trends towards globalization. 4 A global-local approach that stresses the interaction among company, town planners, and residents is uncommon in Canadian and international treatments of planned industrial towns and provides a new and critical mode of inquiry into the development of resource communities elsewhere. The numerous Newfoundland single-industry towns like Corner Brook are virtually "untouched" academic subjects. This provides a distance from which to assess, incorporate, and modify claims made about similar mainland Canadian communities in the same period.
It is essential to define industrial paternalism, utilitarianism, and dependence as they relate to this study. Virtually every scholar who has written about company towns has reiterated these interrelated characteristics. Industrial paternalism is a method of business administration whereby a company decides what is in the best interests of its workers in a manner suggestive of a father's dealings with his children. The term describes the parentlike authority exercised by a company over its employees, and, in company towns, the residents as well. There is also a
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linked utilitarian philosophy underpinning the construction and administration of single-industry communities. Utilitarianism, when applied from a business perspective, means that company decisions should be geared primarily towards realizing a profit. The company town idea appealed to capitalists because it promised to maintain a stable and efficient labour force in a geographically isolated area and maximize long-term profit. Residents of company towns were dependent upon a sole industry because it was the raison d'être for the town's existence. The company provided the majority of employment and much of the town's infrastructure. However, as the case of Corner Brook illustrates, workers and residents did not passively submit to company rule. There was an ongoing interplay between company and community. Residents of Corner Brook negotiated a sense of place in a locale designed primarily to ensure capital accumulation. Fringe settlement, community organization, lobbying, and protest were the subtle and overt means of constructing community from below.
Background to Model Single-Industry Town Development
Resource companies applied the top-down administrative techniques of paternalism and utilitarianism in Newfoundland in the first decades of the 20th century. The mining companies of Bell Island provided a measure of housing for their employees in the last quarter of the 19th century, not as new towns but additions to pre-existing settlement. 5 However, the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company Limited (ANDCo.) brought the first planned company town to fruition in the country. Between 1905 and 1909 the company built the so-called model community of Grand Falls in central Newfoundland as an adjunct to its pulp and paper operations. "The pulp and paper industry demanded permanence," writes James Hiller, "and rather than creating a blanket of settlement, it dictated the emergence of industrial centres." 6 Successful frontier pulp and paper operations depended on the continued welfare of skilled workers. The industry's need for a variety of trained employees was greater than that of other primary extractive industries like mining. Conversely, the inclusion of skilled workers in planned communities highlights the considerable exclusion of unskilled and non-company denizens from privileged company-directed life.
Beginning in 1923, the town constructed by the Newfoundland Power and Paper Company Limited (NP&P) near the mouth of the Humber River in western Newfoundland followed the same broad pattern as previous Newfoundland single-industry communities but on a more ambitious scale. Despite the remarkable scope of Corner Brook, there has been little scholarly interest in the planning of Townsite and its effect on the residents of that community and the surrounding fringe settlements of Corner Brook East and West. The planning, construction, and subsequent administration of Townsite conforms to the larger model of Canadian single-industry communities. It was a holistic design in the popular Garden City style meant to maintain a skilled workforce, promote industrial efficiency, and generally increase profits for the company in question. Growth of fringe settlements, another characteristic of Canadian single-industry communities, manifested itself in Corner Brook. Though limited to an extent, company paternalism, utilitarianism, and dependence appeared at Corner Brook East and West. There were also positive effects of the Humber Development; it was not simply a case of company control and exploitation. Community development was complicated and enriched in unforeseen ways through the local politics of exclusion and resulting resident responses.
The idea for the model industrial town originated in Britain in the early 19th century. Throughout this period the country was undergoing rapid industrialization, and many impoverished rural labourers were forced to migrate to new urban factory centres. The staggering concentration of poor families, without the means to build or rent suitable housing, led to the creation and unchecked spread of slums. For many upper-and middleclass Britons, the novel squalor of the working-class district was shocking. Some reformers sought greater public health through housing reform, while several radical reformers, such as Utopian socialist Robert Owen, believed that the creation of comprehensively planned industrial settlements could improve the situation of the working classes. 7 Mid-century revolutions brought conservative governments to power throughout Europe, and the ruling elite adopted many reform ideas, perceiving them as "counter-revolutionary" methods of social control. 8 According to Leonardo Benevolo, the governments of all the major European nations realized that "a coherent policy of public works" could be a politically stabilizing force in each country. 9 British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's notion of the "enlightened industrialist" was popular in the second half of the century, and a handful of self-styled "enlightened" capitalists turned to the creation of model communities. Well-known examples of this trend are the W. H. Lever Soap Company's Port Sunlight, and the Cadbury Chocolate Company's Bournville in England, and William Pullman's eponymous train-car manufacturing town outside Chicago. 10 These paternalistic social experiments aimed at improving the lives of workers, but they were more than that. They were also understood to be a successful means of increasing the company's returns. 11 As Theodore Koditschek puts it, the industrial paternalism inherent in the early model company town was more than just a morally satisfying gesture. It was a socially stabilizing policy that would restore habits of deference and tranquility to the working-class community and could even raise profits, at least in the long run. Short-term costs would be later recovered in the cultivation of a healthier, happier, and more productive work force, which would require less support from charity and poor relief. 12 Ebenezer Howard formulated his turn-of-the-century Garden City idea within this broad context. The planned company town became an integral component of Canadian industrialization as well. However, this development took place at a later date, under different circumstances, and on a much larger scale. Capital-intensive primary extractive industrial ventures did not become a prominent feature of Canadian society until the late 19th century. This was partially due to the isolated location of the country's mineral and timber resources. Any firm wishing to develop frontier resource depos-its required transportation linkages, sufficient start-up capital, and some way to secure the needed workforce. By the turn of the century, a number of businesses entered the vast Canadian hinterland and set up operations, mainly mining, in places like Cobalt, Ontario, and Dawson City, Yukon. Companies did not place a high priority on planning for the settlement of employees. Instead, they laid their settlements out in a simple grid formation and generally provided minimal and poor-quality housing. Oiva Saarinen and L. D. McCann have labelled this the "unplanned" or "additive" phase of single-industry community construction, and Gilbert Stelter adds that it embodied the laissez-faire business values of the time. 13 British "enlightened industrialism" was largely absent. The capitalist's primary concern for the "bottom line" outweighed the drive for "improvement" in the Canadian single-industry community.
During the First World War a second, "holistic" phase gained popularity among corporations seeking to exploit the Canadian resource frontier. Lack of planning had been the cause of fires and outbreaks of diseases like typhoid in the previous decades, and a number of provinces introduced legislation condemning unplanned settlement. Also, industrialists believed that planned towns offered the best means of recruiting and keeping qualified workers in remote locations.
14 Finally, the burgeoning pulp and paper industry dictated advanced town planning. Cultivation of an extensive skilled workforce was a necessity, and properly conserved forests could conceivably continue production indefinitely. 15 Thus companies, with the consultation of planners and architects, began to comprehensively design the towns in which their employees lived and worked. The resulting communities, while more aesthetically pleasing, sanitary, and better serviced, were just as, if not more, dependent upon the company to which they owed their existence. Owners of enterprise employed the vast majority of residents, and they also controlled most of the property in the vicinity. Moreover, companies continued to express little concern for employee "improvement." The fundamental rationale of North American holistic planning was that it was a wise business decision. As Oiva Saarinen says, The development of both holistic and comprehensive planning was based on a strong utilitarian ethic dictated by the fact that the single-sector communities were simply a form of human investment required by companies in order to achieve a profit on their operations in frontier areas. 16 Essentially, it was in the best interests of the companies to keep their workers content, not to better them individually or collectively outside the realm of employment. If this did occur, it was a secondary benefit. 17 Ebenezer Howard's Garden City model became one of the most popular designs for the single-industry community in Canada. In 1898 Howard argued for a completely novel planned settlement financed by wealthy citizens who would expect only to make back their initial investment. He envisioned a mixture of residents of varying social groups and income levels in homes of different sizes, each with a reasonable amount of land for a garden and easy access to factories, schools, parks, and commercial areas. 18 Howard also wanted to limit the size of the towns. The settlement was to be surrounded by an agricultural belt, broken up into small holdings. Once the town reached a certain population, another Garden City company, or the parent community, could finance another a short distance away to prevent overcrowding. 19 Howard advocated an evolution towards communal living, but in subsequent years his associates altered this rather unpragmatic vision in its practical application so that by the second decade of the 20th century affluent supporters "looked to the Garden City as the place where capitalism could be most easily preserved." 20 Like the notion of the benevolent entrepreneur, the original purpose of the plan was rejected.
Industrial enterprises, particularly those involved in Canadian pulp and paper manufacturing, found the Garden City model attractive for their community-building requirements. Companies valued the Garden City's ability to be aesthetically pleasing and well built yet economical and compact. 21 As Michael Simpson says, the Garden City in North America was not the "City Beautiful" but the "city useful and usable." 22 Thomas Adams, a prominent and influential British advocate of the practical Garden City, became the main proponent of town planning in Canada during World War I. 23 In 1914 the federalprovincial Commission of Conservation appointed Adams to the position of town planning advisor. 24 During his tenure with the commission Adams successfully lobbied for provincial planning legislation and designed several Garden Suburbs in places like the Hydrostone in Halifax, and Lindenlea in Ottawa. 25 He also supervised the design of the new towns of Banff, Alberta, and the Riordan Pulp and Paper Company-owned resource community of Temiskaming (Kipawa), Quebec. 26 By the war's end, however, the Canadian demand for planning had come to a standstill, and Adams proceeded to the United States. In 1923, the Newfoundland Power and Paper Company Limited commissioned Adams and consulting partner Francis Longstreth Thompson to design a resource town on the west coast of Newfoundland at Corner Brook.
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Construction ofTownsite
The planned industrial community was still a novel idea in Newfoundland in the early 1920s, and only Grand Falls was a holistically planned town. Foreign capitalists owned Grand Falls, and the government awarded ANDCo. major concessions to locate there. Newfoundland politicians viewed each new development as a means of securing much-needed employment and, more importantly, diversification from the volatile, unregulated fishery. By the end of the 19th century, governments placed increased emphasis on the need to industrialize. 28 In his 1920 budget speech, Liberal-Reform Finance Minister H. J. Brownrigg complained that enormous potential forest wealth lay "dormant and depreciating awaiting for the investment of capital to convert it into gold for our people." 29 In the early 1920s the newly established Newfoundland Power and Paper Company Limited sought to develop that resource further. James Hiller documents the arduous negotiations between the Newfoundland government and NP&P that resulted in the creation of the development at Corner Brook. 30 Basically, the Reid Newfoundland Company, operators of the island's railway, had been unsuccessful in developing its extensive landholdings on the west coast. At the outset of the 1920s, the Reids became involved with Armstrong-Whitworth and Company Ltd., a British engineering and armaments firm pursuing post-war diversification, and the companies formed NP&P. 31 The original scheme called for Armstrong-Whitworth to build the pulp and paper mill and hydroelectric plant and the Reid Newfoundland Company to run it. Wary of an already extensive Reid monopoly, Prime Minister Richard Squires's government would sanction the project only if Armstrong-Whitworth also assumed control of the mill. Armstrong-Whitworth's directors agreed, and in 1923 Squires and his troubled coalition government rode into power on the election campaign of "putting the Hum on the Humber." 32 Shortly thereafter a generous contract was finalized guaranteeing NP&P, among other concessions, two $2-million loan debentures from the Bank of England and the Newfoundland government, a 99-year renewable lease on the land, and no stumpage fees on pulpwood cut. 33 Construction began in haste and on a grand scale. 34 Prior to the "Humber Development," Corner Brook was a small saw-milling settlement. 35 According to the census of 1921 only 411 people, mostly of Newfoundland origin, resided there. Most men were likely employed as loggers, millers, or seasonal fishers. Subsistence hunting, farming, and fishing contributed to livelihood. The community lacked ordained members of clergy, permanent teachers, lawyers, and doctors. Corner Brook emerged naturally and haphazardly as a product of organic or unplanned, cumulative growth. 36 A thriving herring fishery made nearby Curling one of the area's largest settlements. Roughly one kilometre down the Humber Arm of the Bay of Islands from Corner Brook, Curling had a population of 1080 people, and resembled other large outports in its provision of services. Curling had three teachers, a clergyman, a doctor, and 13 merchants. It was also home to the Humber area's lone newspaper, the Western Star. Any services the people in Corner Brook required would have to be found there.
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Into this local context, international capital suddenly introduced a new urban centre. A top-down, industrial, paternalist ethic was evident in Corner Brook from the instance of the first construction. A small cadre of foreign metropolitan capitalists, investors, and advisors directed all aspects of construction, while residents of the hinterland designated for development had no impact on the shape of the immense community upheaval. The people of the area were not consulted in any way on the form development should take. No one in the Humber Valley / Bay of Islands region had a clear idea of the shape of the project. The officials of NP&P certainly knew what industrial construction had to be undertaken, but the decision on where to build the town site was not arrived at until "late in the day." 38 For instance, construction on Main Dam, meant to provide the waterpower for Deer Lake's hydroelectric plant, and the main source of electricilty for the pulp and paper mill, began in November 1922. Building of Townsite, as it was later called, did not commence until nearly a year later on 31 October1923. 39 By this time, NP&P had less than two years before their agreed opening date in the summer of 1925.
From all indications the people of the area were largely unconcerned about the lack of information on the project. Until construction on the town actually began, the Western Star's reports were vague and gave the impression that both the mill and the power plant were to be built near Deer Lake, roughly 100 kilometres up the Humber River. 40 A July 1922 issue of the Western Star assured its readers that though there were no details available at that time, "The people of this country, however, may be satisfied on one thing: that if Prime Minister Squires passes the proposition as a satisfactory one, its feasibility is assured." 41 The most telling evidence of the local population's support for development, regardless of its consequences, came in the elections of May 1923. J. F. Downey, the Liberal-Reform candidate running in the St. George's district, was elected by a landslide 500-vote majority. The residents of the area returned Downey because of his connection to Squires and his party's relation to the Humber Development. In the previous election of 1919 he ran for the conservatives, against Squires, and was soundly defeated. 42 At the end of 1923 over 300 labourers worked solely on Townsite construction. 43 The selected site was a challenge for Adams. As opposed to the flat land considered ideal for town planning, the boggy, undulating terrain of Corner Brook required compromise, not conquering. As Adams recalled, the ordinary rectangular or radial pattern was unsuitable for the environment so he had to adapt the plan to the contours of the land (see figure 1) . 44 Adams situated the largest residential portion of the town in a valley bordered by three hills. West Street, as later named, led out of the valley and towards the other houses on Main Street. From there the remainder of the town fanned out towards the Bay of Islands where the company situated the pulp and paper mill, a short distance away from the convergence of the Humber River with the Bay of Islands. He purposefully set Townsite apart from the mill to maintain a sense of rural living and placed home lots side by side and back to back in rigid, compact block formation (see figure 2). Suitable agricultural land was available directly to the southeast of the main residential area.
The overall design resembled Adams's other work in Canada. Adams planned for a number of curvilinear streets as he, and Garden City practitioners in general, avoided the linear, rightangled grid design of earlier company towns (see figure 1) . Residents had to walk only a short distance from the town to the paper mill, the community schools, and the commercial area on West Street. Likewise, Adams included room for individual gardens and small open spaces to further preserve the impression of country living and natural, organic growth. 45 As in Temiskaming, he planned so those houses would be graded hierarchically. 46 The company would assign house sizes according to occupation. Adams contributed only the initial layout, however. Successive development was left to the company, its architect, and the contractors.
Haligonian Andrew R. Cobb, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's architecture program and former student at the prestigious École des Beaux Arts in Paris, designed the company homes. 47 He chose a "subdued Arts and Crafts" design for the company's houses. 48 Gustav Stickley, a popular figure in Arts and Crafts circles and editor of the Craftsman, advocated the proliferation of Craftsman homes throughout North America. He was also a vocal supporter of the Garden City movement. 49 Stickley emphasized "beauty through elimination," by which luxurious design was avoided in favour of simpler, more natural forms. He envisioned cottage-style homes constructed from materials native to the area. Accordingly, Townsite's location in a heavily forested region dictated wooden rather than stone homes. Under direction from company officials, Cobb had good reason to apply this style. The Craftsman home's minimal yet attractive appearance meant an aesthetically pleasing community at a cost affordable to the company.
Cobb designed seven broad styles of residence. The homes in the main residential area were all two-storey structures. Basic two-storey houses, some with liveable attics, some of a smaller variety, and duplexes, were the three most prominent styles of structure (see figure 2) . 50 Other common features of the dwellings included solid concrete foundations instead of basements, shingled structures with steep-pitched roofs, dormer windows, and large porches or verandas set under overhanging roofs. 5 ' Most houses had a sizable backyard for a garden. 52 Though the dwellings were ready-made for their residents and of the same basic design, Cobb maintained significant diversity to downplay the repetition inherent in earlier planned company towns.
The company envisioned and recorded a strict plan for the community. Each style of dwelling had a booklet of specifica- tions at least 20 pages long, which the contractors followed to the letter or faced dismissal. On site, only Cobb had the authority to interpret the specifications and to approve changes. 53 Each booklet contained minutely detailed instructions for masons, carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. Carpenters were told what kinds of wood to use, the thickness of mouldings and doors, and the colour and type of shingles, while electricians were required to wire each style of home a particular way. Nothing was left to chance. Furthermore, dwellings were be constructed with material of the "best quality and grade ... unless otherwise specified." 54 One booklet stated, All timber and lumber shall be first class merchantable quality, free from wane, streakes, large or dead knots, worm or auger holes, or any other defects that would impair its strength and durability. 55 Interviewed on the Corner Brook public access program The Mill Basket in 1997, Gerry Cooke, a resident of Townsite in its early years, commented extensively on the quality craftsmanship that went into the homes. 56 The majority of residences remain in excellent condition nearly 75 years later. In their rigorous top-down design, company officials took a long-term view of investment and returns on capital.
Quality craftsmanship and rigid adherence to pre-arranged stipulations were characteristics of executive housing as well. The Style 7 homes for management and specialists, like the company doctor, were on Marcelle Avenue and Cobb Lane. Offset slightly from the main residential zone, they were the most spacious locations in Townsite. The earliest homes on Cobb Lane and Marcelle Avenue often displayed a slightly different style, Classical or half-timbered Tudor, to emphasize the authority and higher status of their residents. 57 When International Power and Paper (IP&P) took over the mill in 1927, the plan was phased out and managers were permitted to build homes that deviated from the otherwise rigid model. Arthur Scott, an employee of the Town Manager's Office in the 1930s, explained that the homes were organized hierarchically into five types, corresponding to the resident's relation to the production process. These types did not conflict with Cobb's seven styles. 58 Constructed for mechanics and machinists, Type 4 was the smallest home. It was assigned a monthly rental fee of $24 and a standard colour pattern without deviation. Rents increased slightly for homes of higher type. Type 5 homes were set aside for the overseers of the paper machines, or tour bosses, and general foremen of departments like shipping. The Type 3 was for departmental heads, such as office managers. There were also Type 3 Specials for slightly higherranking employees. Lower superintendents and the company treasurer lived in Type 2 homes roughly near the bottom of West Valley Road. As opposed to the regulation that Type 4s have certain colours, Scott says residents of Type 3s and 4s could paint the colour they wanted. Cobb located Type 1 homes for top company executives on Marcelle Avenue and Cobb Lane.
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Unskilled workers were not permitted to live in Townsite.
Ideally, a promotion meant moving to a house of higher status. This may have been the case among residents of Type 3, 4, and 5 dwellings to a limited degree, but it is safe to assume that a mechanic or even the head of shipping would never get promoted into a Type 1 or even a Type 2 home. Most upper- Creating Community level company employees were not from Newfoundland and were brought in for a specific purpose and often for a limited time. 60 Rex Lucas found that limited vertical mobility within the communities, along with comparatively easy horizontal mobility from town to town for the company's upper echelons, was a common quality found within most Canadian single-industry towns. 61 Jose Igartua found that in Arvida the slightly larger, grander homes were in the English quarter. Lucas added that because of their mobile lifestyle, the higher-educated, salaried employees tended not to invest their skills in improving the community. 62 The company arranged everything for the welfare of its essential skilled workers. Even variety was included in the plan, although important standardized similarities remained. Once IP&P took over, homes for management did not have to conform to the specified plans. The freedom of upper management to decide what their dwellings looked like illustrates the paternalistic hierarchy that the companies established in Townsite. A more telling example is the NP&P's grading of residences into five basic types. In Townsite, the presiding company defined industrial and, by extension, community status.
Newfoundland Power and Paper Company Limited and its
successors provided essentially all services to Townsite in the first three decades. At the official opening of the mill on August 1925 one speaker proclaimed, 'Adequate supplies of pure drinking water, proper sewage disposal and other facilities make the Townsite an ideal place." 63 Indeed, NP&P provided Townsite with a supply of clean water and an effective sewage system, but it also supplied much more, including electricity from the Deer Lake power plant via a 100-kilometre transmission line. Once the company erected the first group of houses, it had the streets paved and drained, and built a theatre, community centre, school, and makeshift hospital for employees. The company opened a store where workers could purchase groceries and other supplies, but this was shortly followed by Goodyear and House, a privately owned store and one of the only non-company run businesses allowed in Townsite while it was under mill administration. The company also ran a farm on the periphery of the community to feed its numerous horses and to facilitate the door-to-door delivery of low-cost produce such as milk, vegetables, and seedlings for gardens. 64 A number of company handymen kept the homes in excellent shape.
In all respects, the company's planners built a strong utilitarian and industrial paternalist ethic into the community. Oiva Saarinen sums this up in a wider Canadian context:
As the majority of single-sector communities were adjuncts to corporate balance sheets, the planning process proceeded within a utilitarian framework. Thus compactness and the efficient delivery of basic services rapidly became the norm. 65 This was precisely the case in Townsite. Though NP&P produced attractive homes and a range of services, the town plan was compact, and they standardized the majority of houses beyond minor variation. NP&P created a "model town" in the hopes that it would secure a greater return in the long run. Yet paternalism in the interest of profit was not simply a negative or manipulative force. Company administration benefited residents on a number of levels. The company built a new urban centre of population on the island virtually overnight and helped ease Newfoundland's severe unemployment problem. Also, workers and their families who resided in the town generally enjoyed a comfortable domestic lifestyle at a relatively low cost. However, it was residents of Corner Brook, both planned town and fringe, who ultimately developed a broader sense of place. Impetus for a community ethic above business directives often sprang from company-enforced exclusion.
Fringe Settlements and Resident-Company Negotiation
Not everyone in the larger community of Comer Brook received company benefits in equal measure. Only skilled workers and management could live in Townsite, and even skilled employees sometimes waited for company housing. As Harold Horwood put it, the company town "housed only the privileged ... All others, whether working in the woods, the mill or the service industries surrounding it, had to find what housing they could." 66 For the company, it was necessary only to provide housing for workers with skills essential to the running of the mill; the remainder were considered "transients" and thought to be easily replaceable. 67 In the mid-1920s the labourers who built the town and the mill lived in a shacktown of temporary dwellings close to the waterfront, and unskilled mill workers continued to reside there into the 1930s. 68 They also constructed homes in the burgeoning fringe communities of Corner Brook East, Corner Brook West, and Curling, where there was minimal direct company influence and relatively cheap government lands for home building. 69 As early as fall 1924 private homes appeared outside Townsite, and by March 1925 the growth of the fringe surpassed that of the company-owned settlement. 70 No formal planning went into this phenomenal growth, particularly in Corner Brook West. This led to a number of serious problems.
"Deplorable conditions" prevailed in East and West Corner Brook during this period. In a September 1925 editorial, George Barrett complained that people were "permitted to segregate and erect dwellings outside of Newfoundland Power and Paper Company property, without any regard as to its sanitary and hygenic conditions." 71 C. R. Fay later described Corner Brook West as dirty and unplanned. 72 Exposed wells often became contaminated from lack of sewers, leading to periodic outbreaks of disease. From 1925 onwards, West and East Corner Brook experienced typhoid outbreaks, which proved fatal in at least two instances. 73 Writers for the local newspaper appealed to the Newfoundland government, the body that was supposed to administer the unincorporated community, for assistance. For its part, Newfoundland Power and Paper erected a sanatorium on Humber Road and, for a price, provided inoculations. 74 Fringe settlements were common to Canadian single-industry communities, and Newfoundland followed a similar pattern. Windsor, just outside of Grand Falls, and Pigeon Inlet at Buchans were examples of fringe settlements. 75 Oiva Saarinen argues that the primary division was usually between essential, skilled personnel and unskilled, "expendable" labourers, but maintains that workers were also divided along ethnic lines. 76 While the latter division was not particularly significant in Corner Brook, the town fits the general description. In Corner Brook, the company provided only for the skilled at their own expense. Thus, fringe growth was a necessary development. For workers who did not want to be dictated to by the company in both their work and home lives, Corner Brook East and West must have been viewed as relatively "free" places, a "safety valve" that mitigated dependence to a certain degree.
According to the Amulree Commission Report of 1933, the Humber Development cost more than double the original estimate. 77 In fact, NP&P were forced to establish a subsidiary utilities company in order to borrow more money for the project. Inexperience and lack of suitable markets, combined with extreme haste and pure mismanagement, led to the demise of NP&P. In 1925 the Bank of England forced a virtually bankrupt Armstrong-Whitworth to relinquish ownership of its Newfoundland possessions. The bank reorganized and resold the property to New York's International Power and Paper in 1927. The government of Newfoundland increased its concessions, including a flat annual tax of $75,000 until 1931. The contract stated that thereafter taxation would rise to $150,000 a year but would not exceed that amount. 78 There is no indication that IP&P planned, serviced, or administered Townsite in a manner significantly different from that of its predecessors. Most homes were built by 1928, but IP&P continued to use Cobb's seven styles in the following years. 79 Likewise, it maintained ownership of the community, administering it through a company-appointed town manager.
The global economic depression of the 1930s ended IP&P's five years of prosperity. In Corner Brook this meant increased downtime, wage reductions, and unemployment for many workers. In 1933 the average work week was cut to four days, and most employees' wages were slashed by 30 per cent. This added up to a 50 per cent drop in income. Unemployment was severe in the hydroelectric and logging community of Deer Lake early on, but in the Humber District as a whole the situation was not as bad as in other areas of the country. 80 The official number of jobless in the Humber District shot up near the end of the Depression from 374 persons in 1936 to 712 a year later. Most importantly for the company, the Corner Brook workforce continued to be relatively stable, despite the mass economic upheaval. 81 In 1933 the average employee had worked at the mill for five and a half years, signifying a low rate of labour turnover, and there is no evidence of drawn-out or disruptive strikes. 82 The census of 1935 provides a stunning contrast to the one taken in 1921, and vivid evidence of the impact of outside capital. Statistics are likely distorted by the effects of the Depression, but on the whole they demonstrate the near-total transformation of Corner Brook in the previous 14 years. Of the 15,166 people in the area, 6374 lived in Townsite and Corner Brook West, 1248 in Corner Brook East, and 1622 in Curling, Pétries, and Georgetown combined. There were roughly equal numbers of women and men. 83 The vast majority of residents, 14,578, were Newfoundlanders, but there were also a number of Canadians, Americans, and Britons, undoubtedly skilled workers employed in the mill or related enterprises. 84 In Townsite and Corner Brook West there were 1090 homes, 625 owned privately, and the remainder, including most of the homes in Townsite, rented. 85 The total workforce in the district was listed as 4614, but only 3932 people stated their job and yearly income. There was a considerable disparity in wages between workers in Townsite and those in the remainder of the Corner Brook area. Residents in Townsite averaged roughly $1500 per year, whereas the average earnings in Corner Brook West and East were under $1000. 86 More than half of the total respondents made less than $400 per annum, while 721 earned $1000 or more. A large majority of the latter group earned between $1000 and $2000, and all were male. Just over 600 women, most employed domestically or in the retail sector, responded to the census, and 462 made less than $200 a year. 87 Men were employed in a variety of positions. General unskilled labourers, no doubt mostly mill workers, made up the largest proportion. There were also 433 loggers, 152 carpenters, 29 machinists, 24 painters, and 21 mechanics. 88 Nearly all working people in Corner Brook, whether inhabitants of the company town or fringe settlements, owed their livelihoods, in whole or in part, to the area's sole industrial enterprise. Though paternalism was mitigated in Comer Brook West and East, their populations relied almost completely on the continuation of the mill.
By the mid-1980s several residents had opened small businesses. There were over 200 salespeople in the Corner Brook area in 1935. A survey of advertisements in the Western Star between 1925 and 1940 gives an idea of the range of choice available for consumers. The Bay of Islands Board of Trade was established shortly after the arrival of NP&P, but in the mid1920s there were few stores. Goodyear and House, the company store, and a pharmacy located in Townsite, and John M. Noah's store opened on Broadway in Corner Brook West (see figure 3 ), but most advertisements were for shops in Curling. By the late 1930s the situation had changed dramatically. The communities now had a range of retailers. Goodyear and House expanded and opened branches in Corner Brook West and Humbermouth. Broadway, the downtown area of Corner Brook West, experienced the most growth. Variety and grocery stores, furniture outlets, restaurants, and a jewellery shop made it the largest commercial centre on the west coast. In Townsite and Curling little had changed. The Corner Brook Co-operative Society store located in Townsite after 1937. Other consumer services included several banks, three theatres, bakeries, and ten barbers. 89 A range of retail options had quickly appeared in the area, and the company exercised no monopoly over supplies. The small, privately owned commercial enterprises in Corner Brook owed their initial existence to the coming of the mill, but there was no real restriction of retail services, as Lucas says is the case in the average Canadian single-industry town. 90 Considering that most Newfoundlanders still lived in small, relatively isolated outports at the time, Corner Brook had an impressive range of consumer choice. NP&P and succeeding owners strongly encouraged "a good social and sporting atmosphere in the community" from the beginning. 91 Residents of Townsite organized a number of sports and entertainment associations. Company socials and church garden parties were also popular forms of recreation. Lucas says "an almost obsessive quality has been attributed to recreational activities, voluntary associations and formal organizations in communities of single industry. The companies have felt that in order to have a stable and contented labour force in the industrial plant, the employees and especially their wives and children, must be happy in their leisure hours. An employee who is actively engaged in sports or hobbies, they reasoned, has no time or excuse to grumble, and is, therefore, likely to be happy at his work if he is happy at his play and homelife. Hence, the companies encouraged organization of and participation in recreation activities, and in many instances provided such facilities themselves during the early stages of the town's growth. 93 This analysis partly applies to Corner Brook, but residents regularly organized pastimes on their own initiative. For instance, nearly a year before a formal winter sports association was established, company employees and contracted construction workers, possessing their own equipment, lobbied the company for space to play hockey. 95 NP&P readily provided a warehouse as a makeshift rink. In the following years, the companies let equipment and buildings for hockey and recreational skating at a nominal fee, and awarded trophies for league champions. The original Senior Hockey League organized teams based on mill occupations, but by 1946 the other settlements organized teams and the league operated geographically. The company originally co-opted community initiatives in hockey, but in this case it was not a sinister form of social control. In an isolated location, residents demanded pastimes and readily accepted company aid. A subtle and largely informal negotiation between community and company is evident.
There were possibilities for other forms of local, extra-company organization within certain constraints. The Bay of Islands Board of Trade and the consumer's co-operative are two previously cited examples. 95 Another instance was the movement to establish a new school between 1924 and 1925. In December 1924 a number of citizens requested that NP&P build a school to accommodate workers' children. 96 The company agreed with requests, and by January 1926 the amalgamated Public School on West Street was opened. The 12-member Public School Committee, responsible for decisions on admission and curriculum, had three seats set aside for company appointees. 97 That same year, Board of Trade members from Corner Brook East, West, and Curling formed the Bay of Islands Light and Power Company Ltd. in order to purchase electricity from NP&P. By late August 1927 a reliable power supply was available in certain areas of Curling and the West Side. Next, residents of Corner Brook West obtained access to the company's water supply. 98 Some community and small business initiatives were more successful than others, but these examples depict various successful attempts by organized, concerned residents to improve community life. On the whole, the mill owners acceded to the requests of the organizations as long as they were duly compensated, had a say in further developments, and were put at no financial risk. In other words, the company was open to negotiation but had to endorse community initiatives throughout the greater Corner Brook area in order to for them to proceed.
Hit hard by the Depression, IP&P was looking to sell its Newfoundland properties by 1937. In September 1938 Newfoundland's Commission of Government finalized an agreement with the Bowater Corporation, a growing British concern involved primarily with pulp-and-paper manufacture and shipping. 99 Bowater was granted concessions beyond what the previous company received. In each crisis, government increased incentives. The commission continued the annual $150,000 flat tax and cancelled customs duties on coal and other materials for a number of years. The contract, like those before it, gave Bowater basically complete control of Townsite, permitting it to make and enforce laws within Townsite dealing with building, sewage, lighting, water, fire protection, the keeping of animals, general public health, closing hours, and any other requests Bowater made it out of the Depression in a promising financial position. Since the mid-1980s the corporation had been trying to secure a foothold in the North American newsprint market, and the Corner Brook mill offered that opportunity. 101 By the time Bowater secured the generous Newfoundland contract, the global economy started to recover and the war boom of the 1940s put the Corner Brook operation on a profitable basis. Eric Bowater, head of the company, called it "one of the most efficient and lowest cost producing mills in North America." 102 The success of Bowater's Corner Brook holdings, through increased production and a retreat from paternalism, was largely responsible for facilitating the company's transition from a family-owned business to a diversified multinational corporation.
Shortly after the takeover, Bowater appointed Montgomery Lewin to manage both the mill and the town. 103 He initiated some beautification projects, like tree-planting, in the Townsite area, but Bowater considered divesting itself of the extra administrative and maintenance costs of the community. The company was less concerned with costly industrial paternalism than its predecessors, and more with improving efficiency. After 1939, new homes continued to be constructed in Townsite, but all were privately owned and deviated from Cobb's seven styles. 104 During the 1940s Bowater maximized profits at Corner 106 The fundamental idea underlying industrial paternalism was increased profit "in the long run." Bowater arrived just in time to reap the benefits, and sell off the assets.
The company preserved its administrative powers throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, but shunned new financial obligations to the larger community of Corner Brook. In 1943 the Roman Catholic School Board, the Humber Housing Co-operative Society, and the Bowater Employees' Welfare Association requested aid from the Newfoundland Commission of Government to set up a model community between Townsite and Comer Brook West for "average," likely unskilled, workers who could not secure adequate land to build a home or whose housing conditions were substandard. Bowater concurred with the scheme but refused to contribute financially beyond the annual $150,000 stipulated in its contract. However, the company did demand the right to approve planning and architectural designs. 107 Bowater maintained political control over Townsite throughout this period. Up to 1951 six company-appointed members, with Town Manager Lewin the top official, administered the town. From the end of World War II, however, the other municipal governments in the Corner Brook area advocated amalgamation into one city, and in 1951 three members of the Townsite council were elected for the first time. 108 Not only did the fully elected municipal governments of Corner Brook East, West, and Curling push the amalgamation issue, but so too did Bowater. 109 Company executives wanted to pass the financial burden of administration and the provision of services to an elected body. From the perspective of Bowater, this conformed to a general willingness to eliminate costly paternalist practices and maximize profit.
In the other settlements, amalgamation signified higher total revenue, the provision of basic services to all residents, and the power to decide future local economic and community development. The issue was especially important to the people of Corner Brook West. Since 1935 many residents of the fringe settlement had advocated the incorporation of municipal government, but W. R. Howley, the commissioner for justice at the time, refused to consider it. The commission was preoccupied with mass unemployment and the wider economic crisis. Howley said the commission would consider the matter when it got "round to it." 110 The request was not granted until 1942, and by then the estimated cost of basic improvements, such as decent roads, electricity, and clean water for all residents, and proper sewage treatment, exceeded $200,000. 111 The difficulties did not end with municipal incorporation. In a 1950 report on the options available to the residents of the Corner Brook area, H. Carl Goldenberg concluded that the only viable choice was immediate co-operation between settlements and eventual amalgamation. For instance, Corner Brook West was the second-biggest municipality in Newfoundland, with 7500 people. There were 981 homes, 112 retail outlets, and 29 other trades, plus a number of warehouses, barns, and other buildings. Of these, only 250 properties were serviced with both water and sewer, another 135 received water only, and electricity was extremely limited. Moreover, the tax base was insufficient to remedy the situation, and there was no financial aid from Bowater and very little from the provincial government. 112 The same basic conditions prevailed in Corner Brook East and Curling. It is not surprising that people outside Townsite strongly supported amalgamation in 1955. 113 Bowater obtained the greatest immediate benefit from the union. Residents of the three underprivileged settlements eventually received the aforementioned advantages, but problems persisted in the new city. The familiar difficulties of basic service provision lingered after amalgamation. Taxation, particularly schools, became a contested issue in 1956, factionalism among the representatives often deadlocked council, and a substantial debt accumulated in subsequent years. 114 Meanwhile, Bowater shed the town, ended its administration there, erased the financial burden of service provision, and concentrated on the pulp and paper industry. The company agreed to pay an annual grant in lieu of municipal taxation, which was to be divided equally among the four former settlements. In 1956 this grant amounted to $110,000. Yet Corner Brook West resident and former mayor Pat Griffin contends that in the year before amalgamation Bowater spent roughly $250,000 on Townsite alone. 115 Writing on Bowater's strategy, James Hiller summarized their utilitarian practices from the late 1930s onward:
Bowater, indeed, was the real winner, since Corner Brook provided him over the years with handsome profits and a bridgehead from which to develop extensive North American operations; and when it no longer served its purpose, his successors sold it in 1984 to Kruger Incorporated, which in turn demanded and received massive financial aid. 116 Change in Comer Brook generally had to be acceptable to company executives. Nevertheless, residents successfully negotiated and pushed the boundaries of company control to create a community defined by local interpersonal relationships instead of global capital accumulation. After 1955, company control was no longer of an overtly paternalist variety, but dependency continued.
Industrial paternalism was evident in Corner Brook from 1923 to 1955. The planned Townsite was of the popular holistic Garden City design, which had its roots in tum-of-the-century British planning circles and, more recently, World War l-era Canadian resource town development. The Newfoundland Power and Paper Company Ltd., like other industrial firms of their day, utilized the model to provide a comfortable lifestyle for their essential, skilled personnel and management in the hope of maintaining a contented workforce and higher profits. The primary reason for building the town was profit-centred utilitarianism, not reform-minded paternalism. Homes were meticulously constructed and graded hierarchically according to residents' occupation at the mill, and basically all services were company owned and administered. A larger hierarchy emerged through the growth of segregated fringe settlements like Corner Brook West, settlements characteristic of Canadian and other Newfoundland single-industry communities. Unskilled workers and non-company employees were excluded from the planned community hierarchy and had to construct accommodations and a sense of place elsewhere. The Corner Brook fringe settlements received no support from the companies responsible for their existence.
Conclusion
Neither Townsite nor the Corner Brook area as a whole was the "ideal" or most "cheerfully communal" settlement, though boosterist public addresses and the media claimed otherwise. 117 Yet Corner Brook cannot be described simply as an exploited and demoralized community. On the one hand, there were certainly varying degrees of imposed inequality: company-appointed officials governed Townsite; unskilled workers and other inhabitants were segregated due to company-defined lower status; women were generally unable to find gainful employment; there was little chance for vertical mobility within Townsite; and, most significantly, almost every inhabitant depended on a company concerned primarily with increasing returns and not on improving the lives of residents. Furthermore, the governments legally responsible for the fringe settlements played a minor role in their improvement. On the other hand, massive outside capital infusion spun off several benefits and opportunities. It laid the groundwork for a new city. The companies, regardless of the over-generosity of their contracts, provided revenue for Newfoundland and helped alleviate unemployment. Some town residents prospered and enjoyed comfort, readily available services, and consumer choices previously obtainable only in Grand Falls and St. John's. Citizens organized and improved their community in various ways. Yet most local initiatives in all parts of the wider community had to be acceptable to the company. As Bowater's backing of amalgamation illustrates, only those initiatives that would benefit or not harm the company received its all-important support.
Although constrained in their options by dependence on global capital, the residents of Corner Brook shaped their local surroundings to a considerable degree. A clearly defined globallocal dynamic is evident in the community development of Corner Brook at this time. Company-inspired foreign planning ideas were transplanted to a remote resource frontier location creating a modern, new town virtually overnight. But in the years between construction and amalgamation, Comer Brook's residents negotiated the limits of company control and fashioned a distinctive community. As in other single-industry communities in Canada, the interplay of utilitarian industrial paternalism and constant pressure from residents characterized community life in Corner Brook. 
Notes
